On Sept 19, 2016 at approximately 10:00PM (PDT), one of North Korea’s top level nameservers was accidentally configured to allow global DNS zone transfers. This allows anyone who performs an AXFR (zone transfer) request to the country’s ns2.kptc.kp nameserver to get a copy of the nation’s top level DNS data. This was detected by the TLDR Project - an effort to attempt zone transfers against all top level domain (TLD) nameservers every three hours and keep a running Github repo with the resulting data. This data gives us a better picture of North Korea’s domains and top level DNS.
airkoryo.com.kp. cooks.org.kp. friend.com.kp. gnu.rep.kp. kass.org.kp. kcna.kp. kiyctc.com.kp. knic.com.kp. koredufund.org.kp. korelcfund.org.kp. korfilm.com.kp. ma.gov.kp. masikryong.com.kp. naenara.com.kp. nta.gov.kp. portal.net.kp. rcc.net.kp. rep.kp. rodong.rep.kp. ryongnamsan.edu.kp. sdprk.org.kp. silibank.net.kp. star-co.net.kp. star-di.net.kp. star.co.kp. star.edu.kp. star.net.kp. vok.rep.kp.